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I. INTRODUCTION 
United States v. Winstar Corp. 1 held that the U.S. govern-
ment, through its regulatory agencies, can be bound contractu-
ally by its promises to private entities who acted in reliance on 
those government promises and made substantial investments. 
As a result, later legislation that reneged on those promises con-
stituted a breach of contract by the government for which it was 
liable for damages. 
Winstar dealt specifically with a savings and loan acquisi-
tion and subsequent FIRREA legislation, which deprived the ac-
quirors of the benefits of the acquisition. The government, 
through its agencies the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(Bank Board), sought to encourage healthy thrifts and outside 
investors to take over ailing thrifts. It did this by permitting ac-
quiring thrifts to record as an asset, labeled "supervisory good-
will," the excess of the purchase price of the acquired thrift over 
its identifiable assets. This intangible asset was permitted to be 
counted in the capital of the acquiring thrift for purposes of 
measuring that thrift's net worth and capital and reserves 
requirements. 
Congress' passage of the Financial Institution Reform, Re-
• Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Of Counsel, Tucker, 
Flyer & Lewis, Washington, D.C. A.B., University of Rochester, 1968; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 1971. I would like to thank Professors G. Gordon Young, David Bogen, and 
Robert Keller of the University of Maryland School of Law faculty for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
1. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996). 
1 
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covery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)2 forbade this 
treatment, even for thrifts for whom supervisory mergers had 
been approved previously by the government agencies. The new 
legislation caused Winstar and the other thrifts who brought the 
case to fail the capital requirements and, therefore, to either be 
liquidated or to be recapitalized with new private funds. 
The Supreme Court held the government to its contractual 
commitment to permit advantageous accounting treatment to 
the savings and loan associations. Accordingly, the Court ruled 
the government liable for damages for breaching its contract 
when Congress abrogated its commitment through the FIRREA 
legislation. In effect, the Court precluded the government from 
reneging on a contractual promise it made to the S&Ls through 
later overriding legislation. 
Winstar's importance reaches well beyond the savings and 
loan industry because it deals with, and its opinions discuss, a 
fundamental relationship. That fundamental relationship is be-
tween the government's power to contract with private persons 
and to have its promises enforced against it, and the govern-
ment's power to legislate and thereby regulate society without 
constraint by its prior agreement. Winstar opens many and an-
swers some questions regarding the reliance one can place on 
the government's promises. 
This Article investigates the application of Winstar to tax 
legislation that is designed to create incentives for taxpayers to 
engage in certain desired conduct in exchange for advantageous 
tax treatment now and in the future. It examines the extent to 
which taxpayers may rely on those government promises and 
the policy implications that lead from that examination. 
This question is particularly important at the present time, 
because tax reform is once again on the political agenda. It is 
likely that during the next Congressional session there will be 
significant tax changes, perhaps even a move to some form of 
consumption tax, which would eliminate important income tax 
deductions upon which many taxpayers have relied. 
Tax law changes that adversely affect some taxpayers and 
remove benefits associated with previous investments inevitably 
raise the issue whether adversely affected taxpayers should be 
protected from the adverse effects of the legislation through 
transition relief. In its simplest form, transition relief involves 
2. Pub. L. No. 100-73; 103 Stat. 183. 
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grandfathering pre-change investments, permitting those invest-
ments to continue to enjoy any tax benefits that were available 
under previous law. More ambitiously, transition relief might in-
clude compensating the taxpayer for lost value resulting from an 
adverse change in the tax rules. 
Until recently, conventional wisdom held that transition re-
lief was neither required nor desirable. Professors Graetz3 and 
Kaplow," in successive articles, contended that economic effi-
ciency demands that changes be made without transition relief, 
and that the market for property already reflects the risk that 
any tax benefits associated with the property may be withdrawn 
without transition relief. Accordingly, transition relief represents 
a subsidy that augments what would normally result from the 
operation of a free market. Professor Graetz went one step fur-
ther and suggested that transition relief creates an impediment 
to accomplishing horizontal equity in the tax system and, there-
fore, is inconsistent with fair treatment for all taxpayers.5 An-
other tax scholar has even suggested that current taxation of 
previously earned income might be a desirable policy course, be-
cause it would not adversely affect work or savings incentives in 
the future. 6 These are not merely academic theories; the atti-
tude eschewing transition relief was very much reflected in the 
Tax Refonn Act of 1986, which made significant changes to the 
tax treatment of passive investments such as rental real estate, 
with only limited transition relief in the fonn of a four-year 
phase-in rule. 
More recently, however, tax scholars have begun to question 
this conventional wisdom. Both Professor Logue, in a recent ar-
ticle7 and I, in an even earlier article,8 have argued that the 
government should guarantee grandfather treatment whenever 
tax incentive subsidies,9 and perhaps other beneficial tax provi-
3. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income 7hx 
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1977). 
4. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509 
(1986). 
5. Graetz, supra note 3, at 79-80. 
6. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive 'lhxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1993). 
7. Kyle D. Logue, 7hx Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of 
Government Precommitment, 94 MICHL. REv. 1129 (1996). 
8. Daniel S. Goldberg, 7hx Subsidies: One Time vs. Periodic-An Economic Analysis 
of the Thx Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REv. 305 (1994). 
9. Tax incentive subsidies are provisions enacted to induce taxpayers to engage in 
desired behavior or make desired investments by subsidizing the behavior or invest-
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sions, are repealed or substantially reduced. This position fol-
lows from a belief that the government makes promises that are 
embedded in legislative tax incentive subsidies, and should keep 
these promises just as it would if it were bound by contract. 
Professor Logue's most significant contribution to the dialog lies 
in his belief in the efficacy of precommitment devices as a viable 
means of assuring transition relief and of assuring taxpayers 
that they will be able to enjoy the subsidy upon which they have 
relied. 10 He has asserted that tax incentive subsidies can work 
well and efficiently only if the government can be forced to 
maintain those subsidies. That can be accomplished, even if the 
subsidies are to be made through tax benefits available to tax-
payers in future years, if the government makes use of one of 
several precommitment devices. Logue referred to the lower 
court opinion in Winstar Corp. v. United States in fashioning 
such a precommitment device. 
This Article, in contrast, takes the position that the govern-
ment cannot effectively precommit for future years. As a result, 
the risk of tax changes that will affect the investment must be 
borne by investors and must be factored into the computation of 
expected return. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Winstar, and the concurring 
and dissenting opinions, sheds important light on the role and 
dependability of government promises and therefore on tax in-
centive transition relief questions. Indeed, Winstar is the most 
important Supreme Court pronouncement regarding government 
commitment that binds future Congresses. Accordingly, tax in-
centive legislation must be evaluated in light of its implications. 
This Article asserts that the Winstar decision does not reach 
so far as to permit Congress to precommit to a future tax treat-
ment because, under current law, one Congress cannot bind a 
future Congress in the area of taxation through mere legisla-
tion, even if that legislation purports to create contractual 
rights. It follows from this principle that periodic tax incentives, 
which rely on future Congresses being bound by the actions of a 
past Congress, will prove undependable because the government 
cannot effectively commit itself to being bound by them. 
Yet, because tax incentive provisions that can be changed 
without transition relief are not economically efficient, it is im-
ments through the tax system. 
10. See Logue, supra note 7, at 118. 
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portant, in order to accomplish economic efficiency, to assure 
taxpayers that they will be able to obtain the promised tax 
treatment. It is equally important that the government not 
make a promise that purports to give this assurance but is 
thereafter repudiated. Thus, it is likely that the only means of 
assuring investors of the ability to enjoy the promised subsidy is 
to grant that subsidy on a one-time basis, rather than allowing 
a periodic subsidy to be enjoyed in subsequent years. 
Notwithstanding its limits, Winstar is important with re-
gard to tax legislation, because in the opinion the Court em-
braces the principle that the government may not unilaterally 
renege on a promise relied upon by the intended beneficiary of 
the promise. Reliance is an important factor to be weighed in 
constraining government action. The principle of reliance should 
be employed in balancing interests regarding when retroactive 
taxation should be permissible. Although application of this 
principle will not likely reduce the substantial risk of nominally 
prospective changes that have retroactive effect, its application 
should preclude truly retroactive tax legislation. As a result, 
one-time subsidies, once received, should be inviolate. As such, 
they stand on a much stronger footing, and should be chosen 
over periodic incentives in order to maximize the efficiency of a 
tax incentive program. 
This Article will briefly restate the underlying premise that 
economic efficiency requires predictability of the tax laws and 
effective assurance that a subsidy once offered will not be re-
moved after the taxpayer has made the desired investment. It 
will explore the state of the law and scholarly writing regarding 
retroactive taxation prior to Winstar. It will then evaluate the 
precommitment device of granting contractual rights through 
legislation, as well as certain others, in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Winstar. Finally, it will conclude that be-
cause Congress cannot effectively precommit to the future ad-
vantageous tax treatment of an investment, the investment will 
be at risk with regard to future changes in the tax law. In addi-
tion, because precommitment devices are either impractical or 
otherwise unattainable, the only means of achieving taxpayer 
assurance, under either an income base or consumption base tax 
system, is through one-time subsidies. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRECOMMITMENT: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE TAX LAws 
To best understand the nature of the precommitment issue, 
one must first understand the importance of precommitment to 
achieve efficiency. Subsidies that are determinable in both 
amount and duration, whether one-time or periodic, are more 
easily evaluated by prospective recipients in their investment 
decision process than indeterminate subsidies. Knowledge of the 
duration of a subsidy is necessary for accurate present value 
calculations. Creating uncertainty in the amount of the subsidy, 
such as by making a periodic subsidy uncertain in duration and 
subject to removal by legislative whim, is economically ineffi-
cient because it requires the government to compensate prospec-
tive recipients of the subsidy by including a risk premium in the 
subsidy. Inclusion of a risk premium results in overpaying for 
desired activities unless, of course, the subsidy is removed 
before its expected term has expired. 11 
In contrast, a subsidy that is certain in duration and not 
subject to removal without transition relief is predictable for its 
recipients. Economic efficiency is served by predictable tax sub-
sidies (if there are to be subsidies at all) because those who act 
in reliance upon them need not be compensated by a risk pre-
mium for suffering uncertainty. As long as there is a risk of un-
compensated termination, a subsidy cannot attain complete pre-
dictability. Periodic subsidies are most subject to this 
inefficiency. 
It might be argued that the payment of the risk premium 
buys government flexibility to alter or terminate the subsidy 
program mid-course, a right that could be of substantial value 
to the government. However, if the government expressly re-
served this right and exercised it with any frequency, the risk 
premium required to reflect the lottery nature of the incentive 
program would increase substantially. Moreover, recognition by 
Congress of that reserved right would likely encourage exercise 
of the right, further increasing the required risk premium for 
future incentive programs. 
Periodic subsidies are also subject to an additional uncer-
tainty. Even if the duration of a periodic subsidy were assured, 
11. One could argue, however, that a risk taker might actually pay a premium, i.e., 
accept a lesser subsidy, in order to enter this lottery. 
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its value could not be because of potential changes in the struc-
tural components of the income tax, such as tax rates, income 
levels, and market conditions. As a result, the need for risk pre-
miums for periodic subsidies cannot be avoided. 
The inefficiency in the subsidy would likely exceed the risk 
premium attributable to the fact that the subsidy lacks cer-
tainty. That would occur if subsidy recipients were successful in 
exploiting the political process to obtain transition relief from a 
risk for which they had been compensated.12 For example, if tax-
payers who expected a periodic subsidy to last only a short time 
and valued it as such using a present discount calculation were 
successful in keeping the subsidy in effect for a longer time, 
then those who found it beneficial to act even based upon the 
short-term calculation would receive a windfall at the govern-
ment's expense. 
In addition, unpredictable subsidies that are at risk of ter-
mination or reversal without transition relief would impose inef-
ficiency costs on the economy through increased administrative 
costs of the tax system arising from demoralization. That is be-
cause removal or reversal of a subsidy without transition relief 
likely will be regarded by its recipients as unfair. Unfairness 
will be perceived to the extent that recipients expect the prom-
ise inherent in the subsidy to be honored until the end of its ex-
pected term, and that they do not perceive the risk of early ter-
mination as a risk already reflected in the price of the 
investment.13 Enforcement of a tax system that is viewed as un-
fair will require a good deal of coercive governmental power, 
which will increase administrative costs. A self-assessment sys-
tem depends in large part on voluntary compliance and I would 
suggest that voluntary compliance would decrease as the tax 
system is regarded as generally more unfair. 
The predictability and, therefore, the efficiency of a tax in-
centive subsidy depends upon whether the government can con-
vincingly precommit to be bound by its legislative promise re-
garding the future tax treatment of the investment. If Congress 
can bind itself and future Congresses, then it can enact tax in-
12. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Thx Transitions and the Protection 
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REv. 1155, 1173 (1989) (mak-
ing this same point). 
13. If the risk is generally regarded as already reflected in the price, then any lack 
of protection through transition relief would not entail these demoralization costs. 
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centive legislation and assure those who rely on the legislation 
in making investments that the future benefits will be available 
to them. Investors will not thereby demand a significant pre-
mium for undertaking the risk of premature removal. The abil-
ity to precommit, therefore, allows legislators to be more flexible 
and creative in designing tax incentive programs. 
If precommitment is not possible, on the other hand, then a 
significant risk premium cannot be avoided where legislation 
promises future and not simply present benefits to a taxpayer. 
Under these circumstances, legislation with promises of future 
benefits would be inefficient. 
Ill. PROTECTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A THE LAW PRIOR TO WINSTAR 
In the federal tax area, it is commonplace for tax legislation 
to be nominally prospective with retroactive effect (nominally 
prospective) because it adversely changes the tax treatment of 
an investment in the years following enactment and thereby 
reduces the current value of the investment. It is also not unu-
sual for tax legislation to be retroactive, at least to the begin-
ning of the year of enactment and sometimes even before (retro-
active). The law regarding the constitutional restraints on the 
government's power of taxation that either imposes taxes on fu-
ture years by changing the tax rules applicable to certain prop-
erty, i.e., nominally prospective, or actually imposes a tax on the 
taxpayer's past activities, i.e., retroactive, is not well settled. In-
deed, there has been no modern day challenge to the govern-
ment's ability to make nominally prospective tax changes that 
are retroactive in effect, 14 i.e., that affect tax liabilities in the 
current or future years arising from past transactions. Further, 
in United States v. Carlton, 15 a taxpayer was unsuccessful in 
challenging a truly retroactive tax, but arguably under special 
14. Levmore has taken the position that retroactive taxation, that is, legislation 
that exacts a tax on a previous year's income or transaction, is entirely legal. He sup-
ports his contention that retroactive taxes are legally permissible with the bold state-
ment that "[A]lthough the Supreme Court has struck down a variety of statutes because 
of their retroactive effects, it has never struck down an income tax provision on this 
ground, and no modem court has held any federal tax provision illegal." Levmore, supra 
note 6, at 270. 
15. 512 U.S. 26 (1994). See discussion at notes 20 to 26, infra, and accompanying 
text. 
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circumstances. In that case, three views were expressed (the 
majority and two concurring opinions) regarding the rationale 
for allowing retroactive taxation and its permissible limits. 
B. THE RECENT CASE LAW PRIOR TO WINSTAR 
The Supreme Court has made clear that Congressional au-
thority to make retroactive changes is not unlimited and must 
satisfy due process requirements. 16 It has left the precise limits 
of Congressional power unclear, however. In United States v. 
Darusmont, the Supreme Court upheld the retroactive applica-
tion of the 1976 amendments (signed by the President on Octo-
ber 4, 1976) to the Internal Revenue Code's minimum tax provi-
sions, which applied to transactions made in the portion of the 
year (July 15, 1976) prior to those amendments. The Court's 
opinion stated the following: 
The Court consistently has held that application of an income tax 
statute to the entire calendar year in which the enactment took 
place does not per se violate the Due Process Clause .... "17 
The Court also noted that the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 
1926 had each applied to an entire calendar year that had ex-
pired preceding enactment, but added that "[T]his 'retroactive' 
application apparently has been confined to short and limited 
periods required by the practicalities of producing national legis-
lation."18 Previous cases have justified this practice in order to 
include in the tax base "profits from transactions consummated 
16. United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (per curium). Curiously, a 
leading constitutional law text, JoHN E. NowAK & RoNALD RoTuNDA. CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 
423 (5th ed. 1995), cites Darusmont for the much expanded proposition that the amend-
ment can reach back to a year earlier than the year of enactment, a situation not 
presented in Darusmont, and that is likely subject to additional qualification. Specifi-
cally, Nowak and Rotunda state the following: 
The Supreme Court has little difficulty in upholding amendments to income tax 
laws. Individuals should be on notice that all income may be subject to federal or 
state taxation at some future time. Income taxes are often modified, or tax rates 
increased, in order to meet revenue goals of governments. The legislative process 
is such that changes in the Internal Revenue Code are often considered by Con-
gress for several months prior to their enactment. Statutes modifying the Internal 
Revenue Code often have a retroactive application of a year or less. The applica-
tion of such tax changes to a prior tax year is rationally related to the legitimate 
government interest in raising revenue in accordance with current government eco-
nomic policies. (emphasis added) 
ld. at 423. 
17. 449 U.S. at 297 (citing Hochman, infra note 31, as well as other authorities). 
18. 449 U.S. at 296-97. 
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while the statute was in process of enactment, or within so 
much of the calendar year as preceded enactment .... "19 
The Court again permitted a retroactive change in the tax 
law in United States v. Carlton,20 although under special circum-
stances. In Carlton the Court upheld a 1987 amendment to a 
tax provision originally enacted in 1986 that was designed as a 
"curative measure" to correct what Congress reasonably viewed 
as a mistake in the 1986 enactment. Congress had adopted as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 a special estate tax deduc-
tion in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of sale if an es-
tate sold employer securities to an Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan (ESOP). Carlton, the executor of an estate, in late 1986, af-
ter the effective date of the new law, purchased shares of a com-
pany's stock and sold them to the company's ESOP, at a loss, 
and claimed an estate tax deduction equal to one-half of the pro-
ceeds of sale, consistent with the recently passed provision. In 
response to these kinds of "unintended" transactions, Congress, 
in December 1987, amended the statute retroactively to apply 
only to shares owned by the decedent "immediately before his 
death." 
The Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of 
the law to Carlton against an argument that it violated due pro-
cess. Such a retroactive change was viewed by the Court as not 
"illegitimate nor arbitrary,"21 and therefore satisfied the Court's 
requirement that the legislation was not "arbitrary and irra-
tional legislation"22 but rather was "rationally related to a legiti-
mate legislative purpose."23 The fact that Congress acted 
promptly to correct its mistake and thereby "established only a 
modest period of retroactivity"24 (retroactivity extended back 
slightly more than one year and was proposed within a few 
months of the tax provision's original enactment) was a signifi-
cant factor in the Court's decision that the amendment's retroac-
19. United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 500 (1937) and quoted in Darusmont at 
449 u.s. 297. 
20. 512 u.s. 26 (1994). 
21. Id. at 32. 
22. I d. at 30. The Court views this test as the equivalent of the "harsh and oppres-
sive" test set forth in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938X"retroactive application 
[may be] so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation [of the 
Due Process Clauser>. 
23. Id. at 31. The Court stated that this was the same test "that applies generally 
to enactments in the sphere of economic policy." I d. 
24. Id. at 32. 
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tive application met the due process requirements. 25 
Interestingly, the Court distinguished the situation in Carl-
ton from one in which Congress had an improper motive such as 
"targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliber-
ately inducing them to engage in ESOP transactions."26 The ret-
roactive reversal of a one-time tax subsidy, specifically designed 
to induce a taxpayer to engage in the activity desired by Con-
gress, appears to be precisely the kind of legislation that would 
fail to satisfy the Court's "rational legislative purpose" test re-
quired for retroactivity, if one were to take the Court's discus-
sion at face value. 
C. THE COMMENTATORS 
Professor Levmore has suggested that tax legislation is gen-
erally given wide latitude and any attempt to find particular tax 
legislation invalid, including retroactive tax legislation- either 
actual or nominally prospective-faces an up-hill battle.27 
25. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion would have required an even lesser stan-
dard to uphold a retroactive tax. Her due process test would require only "a legitimate 
legislative purpose furthered by rational means." ld. at 37. That requirement is satisfied 
by retroactive application of revenue measures because they are "rationally related to 
the legitimate governmental purpose of raising revenue." Id. That legitimate purpose 
must be weighed against the taxpayer's interest in finality. Thus, short periods of retro-
active application are likely to satisfy Justice O'Connor's test, while "a period of retroac-
tivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was en-
acted would raise, in [her] view, serious constitutional questions." Id. at 38. 
Justice Scalia's ·acerbic concurring opinion (with whom Justice Thomas joined) 
viewed the retroactive change in the tax law at issue as "bait-and-switch taxation" that 
was "harsh and oppressive" and therefore would be unconstitutional as a violation of 
substantive due process, if he "thought that 'substantive due process' were a constitu-
tional right rather than an oxymoron .... " Id. at 39. The fact that there was only a 
modest period of retroactivity rather than a long period, in his view, would not change 
the harsh economic impact on the taxpayer. Justice Scalia was particularly critical of 
retroactivity in the case of a tax incentive provision as opposed to a general provision 
taxing income, because of probable taxpayer reliance on the incentive provision. 
Justice Scalia concluded his analysis of retroactive taxation by overstating, I believe, 
the fear that the majority had eliminated future due process challenges to retroactive 
taxation. This conclusion does not appear to follow from the Court's discussion, particu-
larly as it relates to tax incentive provisions. 
26. Id. at 32. 
27. See Levmore, supra note 6, at 270 n.12. Levmore has catalogued the various 
unsuccessful challenges to retroactive taxation or "retrotaxation," in his terminology, 
based on the Constitution's proscription of ex post facto laws, the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause, and cites Welch v. Henry, 305 
U.S. 134 (1938), as an example of the Court upholding retroactive taxation. First, he 
views the proscription on ex post facto laws as limited to laws imposing criminal penal-
ties and therefore inapposite to tax legislation. With regard to the Equal Protection and 
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Professor Graetz, in arguing in favor of nominally prospec-
tive tax legislation, also expressed the view that constitutional 
restraints on retroactive legislation did not present any signifi-
cant obstacle.28 As a result, he dealt with the economic and eq-
uity aspects of nominally prospective legislation, but did not 
deal in any significant way with the legal or constitutional as-
pects of it. This prescriptive and policy treatment extended as 
well to obligations that Congress may have to tax subsidy 
recipients. 29 
Takings Clauses, he observes that attempts based upon these arguments to disqualify a 
tax have all failed. Moreover, claims against retrotaxes on equal protection grounds 
stand in no better footing than prospective taxes in that a tax, whether retroactive or 
prospective, aimed at burdening a racial or ethnic minority might very well be subject to 
an equal protection claim, but neither type of tax aimed at large groups of past taxpay-
ers or beneficiaries would be vulnerable to such constitutional claims. Finally, he notes 
that "the few cases that do strike down retrotaxes involve retroactive estate and gift; tax 
provisions." Levmore, supra note 6, at 271 n.12. But the cases that struck down those 
taxes were old cases involving transfers that were completely vested prior to the enact-
ment of the retroactive legislation with no notice to taxpayers and, further, all involved 
voluntary actions, namely making of a voluntary transfer. Because receipt of income was 
"somehow involuntary," retroactivity was permitted. Id. at 271 n.12. While Levmore ac-
knowledges that "these distinctions do not withstand scrutiny" as valid distinctions be-
tween taxes that satisfy constitutional standards and taxes that do not, there are alter-
native explanations for the results in the older cases even if one were not willing to 
acknowledge that newer cases have largely upheld the same kinds of taxes that had pre-
viously been held invalid. Levmore concludes his analysis of the case law with the 
following: 
In short, if there is any legal case to be made against the retrotaxation schemes 
discussed here, it must be that explicit retrotaxation has been tried but occasion-
ally, that previous retrotaxes have not tried to reach purposefully and exclusively 
to the past so much as they have represented prospective reforms with retrospec-
tive tails (designed perhaps to take away any advantage from those who knew 
that an enactment was forthcoming), and that no scheme has tried to reach back 
in a way that skipped over a more recent period. 
Id. at 272. 
See also Kaplow, supra note 4, at 565 n.162, which discusses the broad latitude al-
lowed for enacting retroactive tax legislation and discusses the leading cases (prior to 
1986) upholding that treatment. 
28. Graetz, supra note 3, at 48. Graetz does note, however, that the Treasury De-
partment has contended that, "in general, the repeal of code provisions that provide an 
incentive for certain business-related expenditures or investments in specific assets 
should be developed to minimize the losses to persons who made such expenditures or 
investments prior to the effective date of the new law. The principal technique to effectu-
ate this policy would be to grandfather actions under current law." U.S. DEPI'. TREAsURY, 
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 200 (1977). Quoted in Graetz, supra note 3, at 53. 
29. For example, Graetz quotes former Assistant Commission of the Treasury for 
Tax Policy, Edwin S. Cohen, as arguing: 
[P)rovisions have deliberately been kept in the tax law over many years, and they 
constitute standing invitations for taxpayers to erect new buildings, drill for oil, or 
embark on programs of charitable contributions. Even if we should conclude that 
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Professor Hochman, in an earlier and classic article dealing 
with retroactive legislation generally, also observed that Con-
gress apparently has wide latitude to impose retroactive taxa-
tion.30 His discussion, however, suggests that a different conclu-
sion might be forthcoming with regard to a tax subsidy 
provision that Congress designed to entice an investment and 
that was relied upon in making an investment. One can draw 
this inference from Hochman's discussion and his express obser-
vation regarding why retroactive taxation would be permissible, 
i.e., it is not unfair to impose the tax since the taxpayer in no 
way relied on the non-taxability of the income.31 Hochman con-
cluded that the rationale for permitting retroactive taxation is 
that no taxpayer can generally claim that he did something that 
he would not otherwise have done because such a claim would 
require a taxpayer to argue that he would not have received the 
income if he had known it would be subject to the higher tax. 
He does, however, concede that a stronger case would be availa-
ble to the taxpayer if the tax were imposed on income received 
several years prior to the enactment of the statute.32 It also fol-
lows that a different and stronger case would be presented 
where actual reliance was both express and intended. 33 
Levmore's dispute of these theories in the Hochman article and 
his later interpretation of the same cases demonstrates that 
there is disagreement regarding the bounds of retroactive tax 
legislation among the commentators just as their is in the 
courts. 
it would be unwise to continue some of these benefits or if we should alter some of 
them, it would not be appropriate to remove the preference precipitously after tax-
payers have embarked on programs which they might not have adopted except for 
the provisions. (emphasis added) 
Edwin S. Cohen, Administration's Interim Program of 1bx Reform and 1bx Relief, 47 
TAXES 325, 327 (1969), cited by Graetz, supra note 3, at 74. 
30. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroac-
tive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692, 706-07 (1960). 
31. ld. at 707. Thus, he notes that several statutes have been upheld that taxed 
income received during the latter part of the year and, in one case, the removal of an ex-
emption for dividends received almost fifteen months prior to the passage of legislation 
was upheld. ld. 
32. ld. 
33. This inference follows from Hochman's observation that the justification for up-
holding retroactive income taxation does not apply to estate and gift taxes, since the 
knowledge of the existence of the tax would likely or at least very well might change the 
taxpayer's behavior. 
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IV. PRECOMMITMENT BY LEGISLATING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND 
THE WINSTAR CASE 
Although case law strongly supports the proposition that 
nominally prospective tax legislation can override previous legis-
lation, even if with retroactive effect, it has been suggested that 
it is possible for Congress to expressly bind future Congresses. 
Professor Logue has suggested that "contract law should provide 
a way to force the government to shoulder the costs of opportu-
nistic tax transitions. One could allow taxpayers harmed by the 
repeal or elimination of an incentive subsidy to sue for damages 
under a breach-of-contract theory,"34 with damages measured by 
expectation or some approximation thereof. 
The Supreme Court's decision and opinions in Winstar pro-
vide an excellent lens through which conflicting theories of con-
tractual commitment by government and the power of the sover-
eign to legislate can be examined and applied to the issue of 
retroactive taxation. In this connection, a tax incentive subsidy 
would be analogized to a contract, similar to the contract in 
Winstar, to which the government would be bound and subject 
to the payment of damages for a breach of the contract. 
Although from a purely conceptual point of view, the anal-
ogy is appealing,35 as a matter of legal analysis it likely fails in 
a number of respects. First, a tax subsidy provision is simply 
not a contract. 36 There is a significant difference between the 
34. Logue, supra note 7, at 1183. He supports his contract theory with the decision 
in the Winstar case in the Federal Circuit. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit found that the government, through the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, had 
entered into contracts with a number of savings and loan institutions and that Congress 
had broken those contracts. He then analogizes the enactment of a tax incentive subsidy 
to such a contract. 
Logue could have drawn additional support for his proposal that Congress could en-
graft contract notions onto legislation from National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. 
& S.F. Ry. 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 
(1937), to the following effect): 
[A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractu-
ally, the presumption is that "a law is not intended to create private contractual 
or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature 
shall ordain otherwise. . .. Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to re-
vision and repeal . . . . 
See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 564 n.160. 
35. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 313-14. 
36. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 
134, 146-147 (1938)). 
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negotiated contracts in Winstar and the more generalized legis-
latively enacted tax incentive subsidy, which involves no negoti-
ation on the part of a taxpayer who partakes of the subsidy. 37 
In Winstar there was no question that the government had 
bound itself by contract to the accounting treatment desired by 
the Thrifts.38 The case was then resolved by the lower court as a 
simple breach of contract case, with the government's imposition 
of newly enacted FIRREA rules on the Thrifts constituting a 
failure by the government to perform its contractual duty.39 In-
deed, the Supreme Court's analysis on appeal was premised on 
the determination that the government had entered into a con-
tract. All of the opinions then focused on whether the govern-
ment should nevertheless be free to abrogate its agreement. The 
Supreme Court and mainstream legal scholarship acknowledge 
the fundamental legal distinction between a true contract and 
incentive legislation,40 which Congress implicitly retains its 
power to amend. 
Further, if a contract has been formed, would its terms pre-
clude future legislation affecting the promised tax benefits? For 
37. Logue, supra note 7, at 1185. It has been suggested that a contract can and 
should be achieved by means of the administrative process of a private letter ruling. 
Specifically, Professor Logue recognizes that taxpayers who seek assurance of a certain 
tax treatment for a transaction can obtain a private letter ruling from the Internal Rev-
enue Service stating that the transaction will be treated in a certain way and obligating 
the Internal Revenue Service to follow that treatment. This administrative procedure, 
however, has some important exceptions. Among those exceptions is legislative change. 
Thus, if a taxpayer delays in consummating the transaction until after a legislative 
change in the tax rules upon which the ruling was based, the ruling will be of no effect. 
See Rev. Proc. 96-1, 1996-1 I.R.B. 8, which provides, as did its predecessor revenue pro-
cedures, that a private letter ruling will not be revoked retroactively, except in rare and 
unusual circumstances, provided, however, that five requirements are satisfied, includ-
ing that "there has been no change in the applicable law .... " Id. at § 11.05(3). 
Thus rulings of the Internal Revenue Service only bind the Service to treat a trans-
action in a certain manner to protect the taxpayer against subsequent change in the 
Service's interpretation of existing law. They do not protect a taxpayer who has received 
the private letter ruling against new legislation that is nominally prospective but has 
retroactive effect. For example, a taxpayer purchasing depreciable real property in 1982 
could have obtained a private letter ruling that the property was depreciable over 15 
years (assuming that the Service would have ruled on such a well-settled point). Such a 
ruling, however, would not have protected the taxpayer from the passive activity loss 
rules enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which effectively caused the depreciation 
allowances after the effective date of the law to be unusable by many taxpayers. 
38. "The [lower] court found that binding contracts were made between plaintiffs 
and the FSLIC in each of the three merger transactions." 64 F.3d at 1539. The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed. Id. at 1540-44. 
39. Id. at 1545. 
40. See Levmore, supra note 6, and Hochman, supra note 30. 
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example, in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security 
Entrapment,41 the Supreme Court held that Congress had the 
power to amend the Social Security Act to prevent states and 
other public employers from withdrawing from the Social Secur-
ity System even though they had voluntarily entered the system 
and reserved the right to withdraw. 
Suppose that a contract were deemed created by the govern-
ment's offer embodied in tax incentive legislation and a tax-
payer's acceptance by partaking of the incentive. Arguably, this 
could be accomplished through legislation, as Logue suggests, 
with language expressly providing that any taxpayer who acts 
in reliance on the incentive, for example, accelerated deprecia-
tion, will have a contractual right to that treatment so long as it 
is in force and has not been repealed as of the time the invest-
ment is made. 42 This suggestion raises the question whether the 
government would be bound contractually to continue the 
favorable treatment. If binding the government in this manner 
were possible, to what terms would the government be bound? 
How would such a contract be interpreted? For example, sup-
pose in the following year Congress left the recovery period in-
tact but restricted its use against tax liability from only certain 
kinds of income, or, limited its use by high marginal rate tax-
payers, or, made the treatment a component of the taxpayer's 
minimum tax computation. Would such a contract protect the 
taxpayer in those events? 
Further, does legislating contractual rights create an actual 
contract beyond the legislature's power to control or regulate? 
The implications of the POSSE case concerning a reservation by 
Congress of the right of amendment, and the Winstar case 
would suggest not. To illustrate, suppose Congress in the ensu-
41. 477 U.S. 41 (1986) [hereinafter POSSE]. 
42. See Logue, supra note 7, at 1186. Logue's actual suggestion involved a tax 
credit rather than a deduction. His choice of tax credit, however, blurs the distinction 
between a periodic subsidy and a one-time subsidy. If such a credit were framed in 
terms of a fixed amount, creditable against tax liability in equal amounts over the suc-
ceeding, say, five years, or refundable if there were no tax liability, I would suggest that 
it is best viewed as a one-time subsidy paid by the government to the taxpayer and 
reloaned to the government on an interest-free basis, for which the taxpayer receives in 
return a government obligation similar to a note. As such, it should be analyzed as a 
two-part transaction: (1) a one-time subsidy, followed by (2) a loan by the taxpayer to 
the government. The analysis is quite different if the tax benefit sought by the taxpayer 
is dependent upon other factors that may arise in the future years during which the 
benefit would be enjoyed. 
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ing legislative session repealed the provision prospectively by 
eliminating the availability of the special treatment for all ensu-
ing years. The Supreme Court's discussion in Winstar strongly 
suggests that it may be beyond Congress' power to relinquish 
the power to legislate in this manner. Thus, even if one could 
concede the possibility of creating a contract through legislative 
action, future Congresses likely would not be precluded from 
making legislative changes that would breach the contracts. In 
that event, would a taxpayer have a right to recover damages 
based on a breach of contract claim? As discussed by the Su-
preme Court in the context of savings and loan regulation in 
Winstar, there are still several additional obstacles that must be 
overcome in order for a taxpayer to establish that right. 
A THE UNMISTAKABILITY DOCTRINE 
First, the unmistakability doctrine, as it has been named, if 
applicable, would hold that contracts between the government 
and private parties will be recognized as unchangeable by the 
legislature only when the limitation on future regulatory au-
thority is expressed in unmistakable terms. If such assurance 
were expressed in unmistakable terms, then, the argument goes, 
the government would have assumed the risk that subsequent 
changes in the law might prevent it from performing its part of 
the bargain, and would have agreed to pay damages in the 
event that the failure to perform caused financial injury to the 
taxpayer.43 Thus, subsequent legislation by Congress would not 
be constrained, but rather would be construed as a breach of 
contract for which damages should be awarded. 
The unmistakability doctrine, however, is subject to several 
different interpretations and applications, and, as the several 
opinions in Winstar evidence, its scope is not at all clear. Funda-
mentally, it is not clear whether the unmistakability doctrine is 
a rule of law that limits the government's ability to contract 
away its sovereign powers, or is merely a rule of construction 
used to determine exactly what the government is contractually 
bound to do. 
While the government urged the first interpretation, the 
several opinions in Winstar appear to adopt the second. Yet, the 
43. The above statement of the urunistakeability doctrine as applied to retroactive 
tax legislation is a paraphrase from the Supreme Court's opinion in Winstar, 116 S.Ct. 
at 2461-63. 
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plurality opinion suggests that in some areas involving sover-
eign rights, the clarity required for the government to relinquish 
its powers may be so great as to make such a promise very diffi-
cult to make in an enforceable manner. 
The Supreme Court plurality opinion explained in Winstar 
that the unmistakability doctrine represents the point of inter-
section between two fundamental constitutional concepts. The 
first, articulated most recently in POSSE,44 is the proposition 
that one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its 
successors. The other involves the concept of vested rights, 
which, as articulated by Justice Marshall, could not be undone 
after they are granted under law. 
As a result of this tension, according to the Supreme Court, 
two distinct limitations developed to preserve state regulatory 
powers. The first, the reserved powers doctrine, holds that cer-
tain substantive powers of sovereignty cannot be contracted 
away. Included in those powers since early times was the right 
of taxation. As a fundamental power of sovereignty, it could not 
be surrendered "unless such surrender has been expressed in 
terms too plain to be mistaken."45 Thus, the unmistakability doc-
trine requires exceptionally clear and certain assurance that the 
government intended to be bound and precluded from legislative 
override before the legislature's powers of. sovereignty would be 
limited by private rights. As a result, "vested rights" created by 
the national government could be binding on future Congresses. 
The unmistakability doctrine must operate across a broad 
band of situations. The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court 
concluded that the application of the doctrine will differ accord-
ing to the different kinds of obligations the government may as-
sume and the consequences of enforcing them. At one extreme, 
according to the Court, are those contractual obligations that 
could not be recognized without effectively limiting sovereign 
authority. These situations would require a strict application of 
the unmistakability doctrine. For example, a claim for rebate 
under an agreement for a tax exemption should not be beyond 
the legislature's power to change, because to limit the legisla-
ture in that manner would effectively block the exercise of the 
44. 4 77 U.S. at 343. 
45. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436, 446 (1862).See Winstar at 116 S. 
Ct. 2453. 
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taxing power. 46 Therefore, the unmistakability doctrine would 
require the rebate grant to express in no uncertain terms that 
the grant would not be legislatively revoked. 
At the other extreme are "humdrum supply contracts," 
which the Court believes should be enforceable against the gov-
ernment, notwithstanding intervening legislation to the contrary 
without regard to the unmistakability doctrine. In the middle 
ground, the Court would decide the applicability of the unmis-
takability doctrine on the basis of how and whether the govern-
ment and the contracting party allocated the risk that interven-
ing legislation would change the parties' rights under the 
contract. Thus, if the contract expressly acknowledged the risk 
and shifted the risk to the government, then the unmis-
takability doctrine would be satisfied and the contract would be 
respected. In Winstar, risk shifting was the essential ingredient 
of the contract, and therefore, the contract was not subject to 
legislative override, in the Court's view, on the basis of the un-
mistakability doctrine. 
Other Justices viewed the doctrine as one of ordinary con-
tract construction. For example, Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion indicates that he would have decided the case based 
upon a reasonable interpretation of the actual contract as to the 
parties agreement regarding who would bear the risk of a per-
formance-defeating change in the law. This determination would 
be made without regard to clear and definitive language as 
such, but rather would be made by resort to normal contract in-
terpretation rules, in essentially the same manner as interpret-
ing contracts between private individuals. The unmistakability 
standard might simply call for a higher degree of care in imply-
ing promises in contracts involving the government's sovereign 
powers. In Winstar, however, it was apparent to Justice Breyer 
that the government entered into a binding promise to assume 
the risk of future change in the legislation and to hold the 
thrifts harmless from the effects of any future regulation or leg-
islation causing a change in the accounting practices of Savings 
and Loans. In Justice Breyer's view, the government should be 
bound to that promise. 
The concurring opinion of Justice Scalia and the dissenting 
opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist also viewed the unmis-
takability doctrine as a rule of construction, used to ascertain 
46. 116 S. Ct. 2454-55. 
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the intent of the parties where a government's sovereign power 
is at issue. In Justice Scalia's view, the doctrine creates a pre-
sumption that the government has not agreed to curtail its sov-
ereign or legislative powers. The other contracting party, how-
ever, is free to prove otherwise. 
Arguably, the unmistakability doctrine might be overcome 
with regard tax incentive legislation if the legislation contractu-
ally bound the government and clearly set forth the fact that 
the risk of subsequent change was to be placed upon the govern-
ment and not the taxpayer. Just as in Winstar, where the sav-
ings and loan associations sought damages rather than exemp-
tion from the new legislation, the intended beneficiaries of tax 
incentive legislation might similarly seek damages if prospective 
legislation were to be enacted that eliminated or adversely af-
fected their subsidy. 
On the other hand, Congress' arsenal for eliminating the 
benefits of prospective tax incentives, such as in classifying de-
ductions as passive activity deductions or requiring ordinary in-
come recapture, to name just a few, may be so large and varied 
as to cause preclusion of them under the unmistakability doc-
trine to be exceedingly difficult and therefore unlikely. Moreo-
ver, the rationale of binding the government applied in Winstar 
may not be nearly so applicable with respect to income taxation. 
In the Court's view, its rule of construction in situations involv-
ing risk shifting actually furthers the interests of government, 
because it permits the government to bind itself and thereby in-
duce private persons to enter into contracts with it. To cause 
every contract to be subject to the unmistakability doctrine, in 
the Court's view, would weaken the government's capacity to do 
business by injecting unwarranted uncertainty regarding the 
government's commitment to carry out its side of the contract. 
The same considerations, however, may not prevail in the area 
of tax legislation. Rather, it may be crucial that Congress retain 
the sovereign power of taxation, unfettered, at least insofar as 
general legislation is concerned. As a result, contract by legisla-
tion may be unlikely to pass the Supreme Court's unmis-
takability test, regardless of the language used in the legisla-
tion, because it may be inherently impermissible to read into 
the legislation the essential term of relinquishing sovereign 
power over all aspects of the income taxation. It should be 
noted, however, that agreements to end specific tax disputes 
with individual taxpayers, such as closing agreements, in con-
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trast, could nevertheless be enforceable against the government 
in the interests of ensuring an administrable system. 
B. SOVEREIGN ACTS DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court in Winstar discussed a second line of 
reasoning that is instructive regarding nominally prospective 
and retroactive taxation. The Court's analysis in Winstar viewed 
the government essentially in two separate roles: (1) the govern-
ment as contractor and (2) the government as lawgiver. 
As a lawgiver, the government possesses the sovereign 
power to legislate on public and general matters. Under that 
analysis, called the "sovereign acts doctrine," public and general 
legislation can override the government's own contractual obli-
gationsY The "sovereign acts doctrine" balances the govern-
ment's need for freedom to legislate with its obligation to honor 
its contracts by requiring a distinction to be drawn between sov-
ereign acts and acts as a contractor. 
In Winstar, the plurality addressed the question of whether 
the governmental agencies' actions were sovereign acts or acts 
of a contractor and concluded that they were acts of a contrac-
tor. They were designed to protect the government's interests 
and as such were in the capacity of a private insurer. But, they 
were also done to advance the government's regulatory inter-
ests, and, therefore, were sovereign. The Court thus concluded 
that the fusion of these roles is so commonplace as to render the 
sovereign acts analysis of little use. 
The Court then analyzed whether the passage of FIRREA 
was the act of a contractor or a sovereign act and concluded 
that, as applied to Winstar, it was not a sovereign act because it 
was not a "public and general act." Rather than being regulatory 
legislation, relatively free of government self-interest, FIRREA 
had the substantial effect of releasing the government from its 
contractual obligations to the savings and loan associations. 
That effect was not merely incidental. The government's self-in-
terest in the legislation should preclude it from using its own 
actions to absolve it from liability under its previous contractual 
commitments to the savings and loans. The Court viewed this 
47. In Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925), discussed by the Court 
in Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2463, the Court held that the "public and general acts" of the 
sovereign are not attributable to the government as contractor so as to bar the govern-
ment's right to discharge from its own contractual obligations. 
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holding as striking a middle course between two extremes: ( 1) 
that the government's dual roles of contractor and sovereign 
may never be treated as fused, a view espoused by the dissent, 
and (2) the second act, if legislative and public and general, may 
overrule the government's contractual obligation even if the gov-
ernment benefits from being absolved of its contractual obliga-
tions. On balance, the extent to which FIRREA relieved the gov-
ernment of its own contractual obligations precluded a finding of 
the Court that the statute was a "public and general act" for 
purposes of the sovereign acts defense, based upon the Court's 
middle ground approach. The Court also expressed the view re-
garding the limited utility of the sovereign acts doctrine, partic-
ularly in situations such as that involved in Winstar, where the 
government seeks to shift a risk that it contractually assumed 
from private parties back to those private parties. 
Applying the analysis of the sovereign acts doctrine pro-
posed in the plurality opinion, tax legislation that changes the 
future treatment of an investment would appear to be public 
and general, and, therefore, sovereign, if it is not specifically 
targeted at the beneficiary of the government's previous contrac-
tual commitment (assuming there is one). For example, legisla-
tion that raises future tax rates across the board should be re-
garded as public and general. 48 In contrast, legislation that 
imposes a higher tax rate on an investment that was previously 
entitled to a special credit or deduction would not likely be a 
public and general act, because it retracts Congress' previous 
commitment. 
The possibility that the sovereign acts analysis could pre-
clude legislative override of previous tax incentive legislation, 
however, must overcome another significant obstacle. It likely 
applies only if the government is first bound as a contractor. In 
48. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in which Justice Ginsburg joined, 
viewed the plurality's standard of public and general as substantially more amorphous, 
and suggested that under this standard "any tax reform bill which tightens or closes tax 
loopholes is directed to 'government self-relief,' since it is designed to put more money 
into the public coffers." 116 S. Ct. 2483. He concluded that no such legislation could be a 
•sovereign act" of the government in the face of a taxpayer who had received previous 
assurance by the Internal Revenue Service of continued favorable treatment. I d. 
Although the plurality's sovereign acts test may not be susceptible to easy applica-
tion, it is unlikely to be so amorphous as to reduce every act of taxation to an act of gov-
ernment self-relief rather than a public act. Further, Justice Rehnquist's concern does 
not take account of other aspects that distinguish tax legislation from the acts of bank 
regulators. 
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the case of legislating contract rights, however, the legislation 
granting the benefit will likely be viewed as the act of a sover-
eign, regardless of the assurance given that the sovereign would 
not change its mind subsequently. In Winstar the issue was 
viewed in terms of whether the government as lawgiver could 
negate the promises made by the government as contractor. In 
the case of legislating contractual rights, in contrast, the gov-
ernment is acting solely in its capacity as lawgiver. As such, 
there may be no conflict between its roles, in which case, the 
government's powers of sovereignty should permit its· promise 
made as a lawgiver to be retracted by its future actions as a 
lawgiver. Thus, incentive legislation may very well be subject to 
change by future legislation under the sovereign acts doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, it should be rec-
ognized that the concept of contract and contractual commit-
ment is itself somewhat slippery. For example, in the private 
context, a general offer by a private person to reward businesses 
who invest in the inner city would be enforceable by a business-
man who made such an investment in reliance on the offer. In-
vestment would constitute acceptance of the offer and the com-
pletion of a contract. Failure to tender the reward would 
constitute breach.49 
Although it appears unlikely that actual contracts could be 
made through legislation in that manner, the reasons why the 
law might hold offerors to their legislative promises are the 
same, even though there are counterbalancing reasons for a dif-
ferent result in the legislative context. Thus, the existence or 
nonexistence of an actual contract resulting from responding to 
a legislative incentive perhaps can be overlooked in examining 
the role of government commitment and the circumstances 
under which it can be overridden by subsequent legislative ac-
tion. The Winstar discussion would be instructive in that 
circumstance. 
On the other hand, the absence of an actual contract weak-
ens the taxpayer's equities substantially, because it substan-
tially detracts from the taxpayer's argument that the risk of 
subsequent legislative change, the power over which is reserved 
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 45. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A 1892) ("performance ... is sufficient acceptance without the 
notification of it, and a person who makes an offer in an advertisement of that kind 
makes an offer which must be read by the light of that common sense reflection."). 
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by Congress, has been shifted from the taxpayer to the govern-
ment. Thus, the foregoing discussion of the sovereign acts doc-
trine strongly indicates that future legislation could override 
past legislative commitments. 
C. SUMMARY 
In sum, to establish rights against the government as a le-
gal matter, it is likely that those rights must be at least a mat-
ter of contract, as was the case in Winstar. Mere legislation of 
contract rights, though perhaps persuasive and instructive to fu-
ture legislatures, likely would not constitute a binding contract 
on the government, at least under current case law. The lower 
court in Winstar reached that hurdle and overcame it in its find-
ing that a contract did exist between the Savings and Loan As-
sociations and the government agencies. The Supreme Court left 
that finding unchanged. 
If that hurdle is overcome, either because an actual contract 
can be found, or because, as discussed above, none is necessary, 
the questions raised must still be addressed regarding the 
meaning of the contract and the conflict between enforcing con-
tractual rights against the government but not impinging on the 
government's sovereign power. The Supreme Court is itself di-
vided on the tests that should be applied, including the scope 
and application of the unmistakability doctrine and the sover-
eign acts doctrine. Tax legislation, however, is the sovereign 
power most likely to be viewed as a reserved power of the sover-
eign and therefore subject to future change. Establishing that 
the risk and burden of future change has been assumed by the 
government likely will prove to be no easy task. 
Finally, the doctrines of unmistakability and sovereign acts 
come into play when there is indeed a conflict between the gov-
ernment's role as contractor and the government's role as law-
giver. In a situation where a taxpayer's rights derive from legis-
lation and not an actual binding contract with the government, 
the conflict should not arise, because in both respects, the gov-
ernment may best be viewed as acting as a lawgiver and en-
joying the rights of a sovereign. It may be bad policy, both long-
term and short-term, to retract a legislative promise, but the 
weight of the existing Supreme Court precedent strongly indi-
cates that it is within the purview of Congressional discretion. 
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Discretion by its very nature may be exercised wisely or 
unwisely. 
The law in this area is at best unsettled, and at worst, un-
protective of taxpayer reliance.50 More importantly, however, it 
is doubtful whether the prospective recipients of any new tax in-
centives would believe, under the current state of the law, and 
knowing past history, that they would be protected against op-
portunistic behavior in advance of actual litigation. Recall that 
in Winstar, the thrifts believed that they could rely on the gov-
ernment's written assurances, only to be subjected later to a 
completely new regulatory regime as a result of the passage of 
FIRREA. Taxpayers would also realize that appeal to the courts, 
perhaps even to the Supreme Court, would be expensive and 
could take many years. 
This Article cannot reach a definite answer to the inquiry 
regarding the constitutional limits on the Congress revoking 
previously granted future tax benefits on which taxpayers have 
relied, if those limits exist at all.51 It does make the observation, 
and I believe an important one, that if legal scholars cannot 
agree on the permissible limits of taking away tax benefits, and 
the Supreme Court is divided-even where it has spoken52-it is 
not likely that taxpayers will be able to have certainty that the 
promised benefits from the tax incentive provision will be real-
ized. While there may be several theories for invalidating nomi-
nally prospective tax legislation with retroactive effect, and al-
ternative mechanisms that may be available to strengthen a 
taxpayer's argument that nominally prospective tax legislation 
with retroactive effect should be invalidated by a court, it is 
highly unlikely under the current state of the law that taxpay-
ers can obtain the kind of assurance that they would require or 
that counsel would likely need in order to render an opinion 
that a challenge to the abrogating tax legislation would be 
successful. 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26. See also Levmore, supra note 6, at 
270-72. 
51. It does, however, express the view of the author as to one situation in which 
the limit should be regarded as being exceeded. See infra at text accompanying notes 60-
62. 
52. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). 
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D. PRACTICAL ASSURANCE OF TRANSITION PROTECTION 
In addition, I believe that it is impossible from a practical 
standpoint to give investors assurance that transition relief will 
be forthcoming. 53 Unfortunately, the government in the tax area 
has acted opportunistically many times in the past. The absence 
of legal authority to invalidate the retroactive effect of subse-
quent legislation is particularly troublesome because taxpayers 
are well aware of instances where reliance on government 
precommitment would have been ill-placed. Most recently was 
the enactment in 1993 of a tax increase effective as of the begin-
53. Professor Logue has suggested other precommitment devices designed in part 
to gain taxpayer confidence. Specifically, Logue has suggested that "Congress could insti-
tute formal and informal procedures that would impose roadblocks to changing the tax 
laws in ways that are inconsistent with the optimal transition policy." Logue, supra note 
7, at 1186. This suggestion would also require that Congress create procedural road-
blocks to removing the roadblocks specifically created for the tax laws. It may be this 
latter step that requires the greatest suspension of taxpayer belief. 
Even if such roadblocks could be enacted, a point which cannot be easily conceded 
from a practical standpoint, interpretative problems would abound. Presumably, Logue 
would restrict these roadblocks to changes involving tax incentive provisions, but not to 
changes involving structural provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, such as tax rates, 
for which Congress will likely insist on unfettered control. These latter provisions in-
volve burden-sharing issues. Roadblocks such as Logue envisions would have to distin-
guish between these two types of tax provisions in a world in which there is still sub-
stantial disagreement over which provisions are incentive provisions and which 
provisions are structural. See Gilldberg, supra note 8, at 307 nn.l0-15. Logue also notes 
that the procedural device could be served by Congressional tax-writing committees 
rather than Congress as a whole. 
While the procedural devices envisioned by Logue may reduce the risk premium re-
quired by taxpayers taking advantage of periodic subsidies, I do not believe that those 
premiums could be eliminated entirely, because the devices that reasonably could be en-
acted would not make government opportunistic behavior sufficiently difficult. Moreover, 
it takes more than Congressional rules to overcome a history of government opportunis-
tic behavior. Trust that the government will not act opportunistically in tax legislation 
has waned rather than increased as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Another alternative suggested by Logue involves delegating authority to the Trea-
sury Department and the Internal Revenue Service to design installment subsidies and 
empowering them to play a greater role in decisions regarding whether to extend the 
subsidies and under what terms. Movement of this authority from the legislative branch 
to the executive branch, even if feasible, appears far from likely to eliminate political in-
fluences over these tax provisions. Indeed, with every change of administration and fo-
cus and refocus on tax reform, including redefining what reform means, change is made 
more likely rather than less likely. The political influences may change, but they are un-
likely to be eliminated. Indeed, it may even be possible that putting this kind of power 
in the hands of non-elected officials may insulate decisionmakers from public influence 
and permit them more readily to make changes without any transition relief whatsoever. 
In short, the decisionmaking dynamics may be different under Logue's proposal, but 
there is absolutely no assurance that those differences would move in the direction envi-
sioned by Logue. 
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ning of that year, an enactment that itself was not surprising 
because tax increases had been accomplished in this manner 
several times in the past54 and have been upheld by the Su-
preme Court. 55 
Arguably, optimistic taxpayers could distinguish a rate 
change, involving a structural burden-sharing component of the 
tax law, from a nominally prospective revocation of a periodic 
tax incentive provision.56 Those taxpayers, however, could not so 
easily distinguish or ignore the enactment of the passive activity 
loss rules, which effectively repealed for many taxpayers the fu-
ture tax benefits of investments that they had entered into in 
reliance on the tax subsidy provisions available prior to the 
enactment. 57 
54. Professors Bittker and Lokken have noted that mid-year statutory changes 
have become so commonplace that taxpayers should come to expect them. BoRis I. BITT-
KER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFI'S 'JI 3.3.4 at 3-
30 to 3-31 (2d ed. 1989). See also Kaplow, supra note 4, at 525. 
55. See text accompanying notes 16-19, supra. 
56. Indeed, judicial authority has focused on rate changes in approving retroactiv-
ity. See, e.g., Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930), cited in United 
States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 298 (1994). 
57. I.R.C. § 469, enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 
§ 501(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2233 (1986). The passive activity loss rules, in general, deal 
with the tax treatment of a taxpayer who has only minor involvement in a trade or busi-
ness or who owns rental property. They preclude a taxpayer from using losses from a 
passive activity, that is, (1) an activity involving a trade or business in which the tax-
payer does not "materially participate," i.e., has only minor involvement (I.R.C. 
§ 469(c)(l)), or (2) any rental activity (I.R.C. § 469(c)(2)), to offset nonpassive income. 
Nonpassive income includes income from salaries, investments, and other sources other 
than passive activities as defined in the statute. The rules relating to rental activities 
were relaxed somewhat in 1993 for real estate professionals, but that relaxation came 
years after the impact of the subsidy removal was felt. I.R.C. § 469(c)(7), Pub. L. No. 
103-66, § 13143, 107 Stat. 312, 440 (1993). 
The effect of the passive loss rules has been to preclude taxpayers from offsetting 
earned income and investment income from stocks, bonds, and bank and money market 
accounts ("portfolio income") with real estate and other tax shelter losses. By precluding 
the use of those losses in a nominally prospective manner, Congress in 1986 effectively 
removed the tax subsidy retroactively, from those activities. Indeed, because even cash 
operating losses from real estate and other tax shelter investments and actual reduc-
tions in value in the investments through deterioration or obsolescence cannot be used 
to offset nonpassive income until the investment is sold or discontinued, the anti-shelter 
rules not only removed the subsidy but in many cases imposed a penalty on the activity. 
No attempt was made to compensate property owners for either the loss of the sub-
sidy or the loss in market value of the property. Indeed, Congress, when it enacted the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, appeared to recognize the importance of transition rules in 
preventing some inequity, but in the final enactment failed to provide adequate protec-
tion. The passive loss statute contained special effective dates and phase-in provisions. 
On their face, those rules appeared to exclude current owners of real estate and other 
passive activities from much of the impact of the new rules. Generally, the passive activ-
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Nevertheless, Logue suggests that it may be in Congress' 
interest to pursue the optimal transition policy of providing full 
transition relief to adversely affected taxpayers. That is because 
lawmakers' concern for the government's reputation and integ-
rity would keep them in line. Thus self-interest would cause the 
government to refrain from opportunistic behavior. Taxpayers, 
believing that the government would act in its own long-term 
self-interest, would have confidence in the continuation of a pe-
riodic subsidy enacted by Congress. 
This conclusion appears unlikely. Generally, tax revisions 
and repeal of incentive provisions are motivated by the govern-
ment's desire to correct earlier policy errors or bring to an end 
an incentive that appeared richer than was necessary to induce 
recipients to engage in desired conduct. Repeal is generally jus-
tified with an appeal to achievement of horizontal equity. There 
is no reason to suspect that in the ensuing political skirmish in-
volving repeal of the subsidy, the moral high ground will be 
claimed by those seeking to continue what will have been at-
tacked as a tax giveaway. Indeed, history has shown that where 
the stakes are high enough, retroactivity without adequate tran-
sition relief has won the day. 
Moreover, the history of those governmental transgressions 
will not soon be forgotten, so that even if the lawmakers acting 
in the name of government trust choose not to act opportunisti-
cally and believe that the government will act in that manner, 
their expectation is unlikely to be believed by the taxpayers at 
large, absent some constraining legal commitment on the part of 
the government. 
As a result, demand for risk premiums from prospective tax 
subsidy recipients are inevitable, no matter how well-meaning 
ity loss rules were effective for years beginning after 1986. However, the rules were 
phased in for certain post effective date losses. Passive losses from a "pre-enactment in-
terest" (an interest held on the date of enactment (Oct. 22, 1986) or acquired thereafter 
but pursuant to a written "binding contract" in effect on such date and at all times 
thereafter) were disallowed in the transition years to the extent of 35% in 1987, the year 
following enactment, 60% in 1988, 80% in 1989 and 90% in 1990. These phase-in rules, 
however, interacted with two other important changes enacted under Tax Reform Act of 
1986: the alternative minimum tax and the investment interest limitation on deductions. 
Passive activity losses that were allowable under the phase-in rules constituted tax pref-
erence items for alternative minimum tax (AMT) purposes. Under appropriate circum-
stances, the losses allowed under the phase-in were of no tax benefit to an investor. 
Most important, by eliminating the subsidy entirely for prospective purchasers of the 
property, the legislation greatly reduced the resale value of the property, which was de-
pendent on the subsidy. 
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legislators may be when they enacted the original incentive pro-
vision. Accordingly, I conclude that one-time or up-front tax sub-
sidy payments can best assure an economically efficient subsidy 
that does not require the payment of a risk premium. 
V. AsSURANCE OF RETAINING THE FULL SUBSIDY UNDER ONE-
TIME OR UP-FRONT SUBSIDIES 
A tax incentive subsidy provision that is designed to provide 
a one-time or up-front subsidy rather than a periodic or install-
ment subsidy58 should give the protection of the bargain to a 
taxpayer who partakes of the subsidy. 
Under current case law, particularly in light of Winstar, it 
is very unlikely that Congress could retroactively repeal the 
subsidy and reach back into the year in which the subsidy was 
received by the taxpayer and recapture it from a taxpayer who 
acted completely in conformity with and in reliance upon the ex-
press tax subsidy provision.59 Such an attempt at recapture 
could take the form of a targeted tax in a future year, specifi-
cally targeted against only those taxpayers who had taken ad-
vantage of a tax subsidy in the past. Such a tax should not be 
constitutionally permissible. Although there is no authority di-
rectly on point, the Court's discussion in several recent cases, 
including Carlton60 and Winstar, is instructive and provides a 
clear implication that this legislation would cross the bounds of 
Due Process protection and be constitutionally invalid. 61 Fur-
ther, as time passed following the taxpayer's investment induced 
by the incentive provision, the taxpayer's assurance against ret-
roactive repeal would become even stronger. The Court in Carl-
ton only countenanced retroactive change for a short period fol-
lowing the close of the taxpayer's year, perhaps only a few 
58. With a one-time subsidy, a prospective effective date on repeal would appear to 
provide full transition protection for those who had invested in reliance on the provision. 
In that manner, Logue correctly points out that such a subsidy "essentially comes with a 
built-in grandfather clause." Logue, supra note 7, at 1193. Logue also suggests the use of 
termination dates on subsidies. Id. at 1191. Rather than viewing this suggestion as a 
separate policy suggestion, I believe it is more properly viewed as a special case of the 
others. The nature of the termination dates makes it psychologically less likely that a 
government needs to act earlier than the termination date, unless the termination date 
is many years in advance, in which case the existence of a termination date is of no 
moment. 
59. Compare Logue, supra note 7, at 1193 (asserting the contrary). 
60. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 for discussion. 
61. See supra, text accompanying note 26. 
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months.62 
The Supreme Court's discussion of property rights in the 
context of legislative expectation in the POSSE63 case also sup-
ports this conclusion. Specifically, in POSSE, the Supreme 
Court found that Social Security represented a regulatory pro-
gram over which Congress retained the power of control and 
amendment of its provisions to provide for the general welfare.64 
As a result, elimination of a recipient's contractual rights to fu-
ture benefits or choices did not rise to the level of a taking of 
property, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.65 
In contrast, a levy on a taxpayer's accumulated wealth 
under the guise of a tax on past income appears to be the tak-
ing of a vested right. The Supreme Court took pains to distin-
guish its result in POSSE from the taking of a vested right. 66 
Although the metaphysical distinction between income and 
property is a difficult one, the law must sometimes make it, and 
the tax law has done so many times in the past.67 I would sug-
gest that a previous year's income becomes property when the 
year closes under our annual accounting system, and if not at 
that time, then after the time by which the taxpayer must self-
assess the tax, i.e., the date set for filing an income tax return 
for the previous year's income. 
62. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33. 
63. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 
(1986). 
64. Id. at 55. 
65. Id. 
66. The Court appeared quite clear in its view that property was beyond the power 
of Congress to take without due process, a view that the Court traced back to the Sink-
ing Fund Cases, United States v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700 (1878), from which the Court 
quoted with approval. The Court stated the following: 
In the Sinking-Fund Cases, the Court did observe that Congress' exercise of the 
reserved power "has a limit" in that Congress could not rely on that power to 
"take away property already acquired under the operation of the charter, or to de-
prive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of contracts law-
fully made." 99 U.S. at 720, 25 L.Ed. 496. Similarly, other decisions have held that 
Congress does not have the power to repudiate its own debts, which constitute 
"property" to the lender, simply in order to save money. Perry v. United States, 
294 U.S. at 350-351, 55 S.Ct., at 434-35; see Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. at 
576-77, 54 S.Ct., at 842." Id. at 55. 
67. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (taxpayer who gave his son in-
terest coupons detached from negotiable bonds owned by the taxpayer was taxable on 
the interest collected by his son when the coupons matured) and Hort v. Commissioner, 
313 U.S. 28 (1941) (entire payment received by owner of property from lessee in cancel-
lation of lease constituted income rather than return of capital). See generally, BITI'KER 
& LoKKEN, supra note 54, § 75.3.3. 
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Hochman's analysis also provides support for this view re-
garding the invulnerability of a one-time subsidy once obtained. 
Hochman has observed various factors in different areas of ret-
roactive legislation, generally, that have influenced the courts in 
their upholding or striking down attempts at retroactive legisla-
tion. He stated that "the Court has consistently held that not all 
retrospective statutes are unconstitutional, but only those 
which, upon a balancing of the considerations on both sides, are 
felt to be unreasonable."68 In attempting "to discover those fac-
tors which lead the Court to uphold some statutes and to de-
clare others unconstitutional,"69 he has discerned a guiding prin-
ciple that a statute may not abrogate "vested rights," which he 
interprets as the interests of a party who has changed his posi-
tion in reliance upon existing law and which would cause the 
retrospective act to effectively defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of the party. (Hochman observes that this "surprise" factor 
is generally held to be critical). This principle, however, is not 
absolute but rather must be weighed against the public inter-
ests to be served by the statute or by its repeal, as the case may 
be. Thus, Hochman concludes that there are three factors that 
must be weighed against one another in any particular case: "[1] 
the nature and strength of the public interest served by the 
statute, [2] the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates 
an asserted pre-enactment right, and [3] the nature of the right 
which the statute alters."70 In a sense, the first of these factors 
might be viewed as the importance to the government of raising 
revenue, correcting a mistake, or ending a perceived abuse, and 
the last two of these factors in the tax context might be viewed 
as the interests of the taxpayer in reliance, basic fairness, and 
property rights. The Supreme Court's decision in Winstar em-
phasizes the importance given by the Supreme Court to reliance 
on past governmental actions. 
Even Levmore acknowledged in his defense of truly retroac-
tive taxation that (1) the further back one reaches, the stronger 
the intuition is that the tax will be viewed as invalid because it 
is "further from, and perhaps out of the reach of, later law;"71 a 
68. Hochman, supra note 30, at 694-95. 
69. Id. at 695-96. 
70. ld. at 697. 
71. Levmore, supra note 6, at 268-69. 
HeinOnline -- 14 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 32 1997
32 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TAX POLICY [Vol. 14:1 
point confirmed by the Supreme Court in Carlton, 72 (2) "in large 
part, past calendar periods are treated as completed and are not 
revisited in tax law,"73 and (3) intuition also seems to suggest an 
ordering of retroactivity, that is, a tax that reaches back to a 
previous year to deny a deduction currently taken then is far 
more retroactive than one that raises next year's tax in such a 
way that reduces the value of a taxpayer's previously acquired 
assets (although Levmore explicitly disagrees with this aspect of 
traditional retroactivity analysis). 
Viewed in the Hochman framework, precommitment by leg-
islation adds weight to the taxpayer equity side and reduces the 
public interest side. Specifically, precommitment by contract in-
creases the taxpayers' equities by making it easier for the tax-
payer to demonstrate a reasonable reliance interest on the gov-
ernment's previous action. It diminishes the public interest in 
making the change because it helps to establish that the public 
has received adequate consideration for the foregone revenue. 74 
Yet, these equities must overcome the government's substantial 
interest in collecting tax in the present or future years on the 
basis of concurrent income, a well acknowledged necessary 
power of a sovereign. 
In contrast, the government has much less interest in tak-
ing away a previously granted tax subsidy for a year that has 
passed. Allowing the taxpayer to keep the one-time subsidy does 
not challenge sovereignty in nearly the same way as allowing 
the taxpayer to keep enjoying the periodic subsidy because the 
sovereign has already had the opportunity to levy the tax and 
has chosen not to. Thus, on the basis of the weighing of factors, 
reversal of a one-time tax subsidy would face a much higher ob-
stacle, indeed, I would suggest an insurmountable obstacle, than 
the nominally prospective repeal of a periodic subsidy. 
Equally important, however, is the fact that taxpayers are 
more likely to believe government assurances about one-time 
subsidies than periodic subsidies. In this connection, Congress 
has never attempted to repeal a tax incentive for a year that 
72. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). 
73. Levmore, supra note 6, at 268-69. 
74. Logue's procedural safeguard suggestion and delegation of authority sugges-
tion, both discussed in note 53 supra, are more mechanical, attempting to make govern-
ment's change of course more difficult, thereby reducing the public benefit associated 
with the change. 
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has passed75 and even in the most notable tax legislation with 
retroactive effect, the passive activity loss rules in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986,76 Congress refrained from "recapturing" tax 
benefits enjoyed in previous years, but rather restricted the im-
pact of the tax legislation to future years. It even refrained from 
changing depreciation recovery periods for property already 
placed in service. Even Professor Levmore, who actually pro-
pounded the desirability of truly retroactive tax legislation, ap-
parently concedes the unlikeliness of enactment77 and gives not 
a single example of truly retroactive tax legislation. 
Taxpayers would also be cognizant of the administrative dif-
ficulty of revising the subsidy by identifying the members of the 
recipient group and selecting their previously filed tax returns 
for special assessments, even if that were legally permissible. 
Thus, as a practical matter, a one-time or up-front subsidy is ex-
tremely unlikely to be repealed retroactively. 
In contrast, the precommitment devices face a sliding scale. 
They can make it less likely that the government will act oppor-
tunistically, but not impossible, and perhaps not even believably 
unlikely, particularly when a legislature desiring nominally pro-
spective change will be prepared to make the argument that a 
great public interest needs to be served by a change in the tax 
law in the name of "reform." 
Thus, taxpayers who are prospective takers of a one-time 
subsidy would likely regard the subsidy as completely predict-
able because it will be received in hand virtually immediately,78 
at a time prior to any likely reversal of Congressional policy. 
Once the year of receipt is closed, both legal and historical anal-
ysis suggest that reversal would be unlikely. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nominally prospective tax legislation with retroactive effect 
appears to be permissible under current case law. Precommit-
ment devices may strengthen the argument against abrogation, 
but even legislating contract rights is unlikely to bind future 
75. Carlton might seem to be an exception to this statement, but the Court clearly 
viewed it as the correction of a mistake. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 29-31. 
76. See supra, note 57. 
77. Levmore, supra note 6, at 270, 305-07. 
78. Actually, it will be obtained at the time taxes would ordinarily be due for the 
taxable year. 
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Congresses or give aggrieved taxpayers a cause of action for 
damages. In contrast, one-time subsidies are likely protected 
from retroactive repeal. 
Moreover, these policy alternatives stand on a different foot-
ing from a practical standpoint as well. Prospective investors 
are more likely to believe in the assurance that they will be able 
to retain a one-time tax subsidy received in the year of invest-
ment than that they will be entitled to continued receipt of a pe-
riodic or installment subsidy several years after they have made 
the investment. Congress' opportunistic behavior in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 would serve to confirm that belief. 
Consider, for example, a prospective homeowner who 
purchases a house with a large mortgage, the interest on which 
is deductible under current tax law. 79 The current income tax 
law, however, is subject to change, at least for future years, and 
the deduction could be eliminated. Moreover, if a consumption 
or flat tax were adopted, the deduction likely would also be 
eliminated. Consider the taxpayer's likely response if given a 
choice between a cash subsidy equal to the present value of fu-
ture tax deductions in lieu of the tax deductions themselves (re-
captured in part with interest in the event the house is sold pre-
maturely) or Congress' assurance of the continuation of the 
deductibility of home mortgage interest payments, by legislative 
precommitment or otherwise. 
Finally, even if retroactive tax legislation that would effec-
tively reverse and require repayment of an already obtained tax 
subsidy is a possibility, the probability is vastly smaller than 
the probability of the discontinuance of a periodic or installment 
subsidy to be received over future years. It follows, therefore, 
that the risk premium likely required by a one-time or up-front 
subsidy would be significantly smaller (perhaps zero) than the 
premium likely required to induce the taxpayer to make use of a 
periodic or installment subsidy. Government precommitment 
does not appear to be a viable solution to government 
opportunism. 
79. See I.R.C. § 163(h) for current allowance of and limitations on this deduction. 
